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Chapter Twenty 
The Analytic/Continental Divide1: A 
Contretemps? 
Jack Reynolds 
In the late 1980s, U.S. economist Jeremy Rifkin claimed that a battle was 
brewing over the politics of time because he felt that the pivotal issue of the 
twenty-first century would be the question of time and who controlled it 
(Rifkin 1987). I want to suggest that a battle over the politics of time is also 
what is at stake in the differences between so-called analytic and Continental 
philosophies. Of course, judging purely by the names bestowed upon them, 
the distinction between analytic and Continental philosophy is rather con-
fused. It simultaneously invokes both a method-analysis-and a geographi-
cal location--Continental Europe. Even on its own terms, the geographical 
determination is clearly inadequate, since most so-called Continental philos-
ophy is currently practiced in the United States, and Europeans (especially 
Germans and Austrians) were fundamental to the emergence and develop-
ment of early analytic philosophy. Despite these definitional problems, how-
ever, I think Bernard Williams (1985) and Hilary Putnam (1997: 203) are 
wrong to conclude that it is a distinction without a difference, and that we are 
all just doing philosophy with no need for any preceding 'adjective' like 
Continental or analytic. In what follows, I will argue that very different 
philosophies of time, and associated methodological techniques, serve to 
define representatives of each of these groups and also to guard against their 
potential interlocutors. 
To begin with, then, let me offer a patchy history of philosophy of time in 
the early twentieth century, the period in which the idea of a 'divide' between 
two ways of doing philosophy became entrenched. Primarily through the 
work of John McTaggart, Bertrand Russell, Edmund Husserl, and Henri 
Bergson, and then slightly later in the work of the logical positivists ( espe-
cially Rudolph Carnap and Hans Reichenbach) and Martin Heidegger, time 
came to the forefront of both philosophical attention and the broader social 
milieu as these philosophical accounts of time were forced into an engage-
ment with physics, particularly Einstein's theory of relativity. Einstein 
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showed, firstly, that time is relative, in that if one travels at close to the speed 
of light away from their friend, their time will pass considerably slower 
compared to their friend who is still 'stationary' on Earth. This might seem to 
call into question the notion of objective or absolute time, but given other 
related developments in physics, particularly in quantum mechanics, it actu-
ally led to the generally accepted idea (by most analytic philosophers and 
physicists) that rather than time and space being separable we need to think 
of a single space-time continuum (or 'block') with four-dimensions, of which 
time is a one-dimensional sub-space. Such a position entails a radical ques-
tioning of any primacy accorded to the 'now,' perhaps best exemplified by 
the philosophical position termed 'presentism,' where only the present is 
thought to be ontologically real, and the past and the future are not-that is, 
since we can't point to Socrates anywhere, he is not real. 2 In fact, it is usually 
accepted that four-dimensionalism in physics means that our experience of 
the 'now' (the 'immediate present') and the notion of temporal becoming are 
but subjectively compelling illusions. This constitutes quite a challenge to 
both commonsense conceptions of time and our everyday experience of time. 
I will return to the question of whether such reductionism is necessary 
towards the end of the chapter, but the Continental 'temporal turn' reached 
its 'tipping point' with the work of Bergson, Husserl, and Heidegger. Argu-
ments against any ontological privilege accorded to the 'now' and any con-
ception of time based on a succession of instants were also raised by these 
philosophers, but generally their reflections on time were not couched in 
terms of the latest developments in physics or mathematics. Certainly, the 
deferential relation to the findings of the sciences that is evinced by most 
analytic philosophers is not apparent. Bergson, widely regarded as the most 
famous philosopher in the world from the turn of the century to World War I, 
initiated a very different revolution in thinking about time around the start of 
the twentieth century. He did so by illustrating the importance of a non-
measurable lived time (duree) that is also said to be the proper medium of 
thinking (via 'intuition' rather than the intelligence), and he also proposed 
radical alterations to the way we think about memory. For him, the past 
remains real and part of all of our experience, existing as what he calls a 
virtual temporality (a time that is real, but not present), and it is not reducible 
to the linear order that clock-time or the 'succession of instants' model gives 
us, in which we proceed from past to present to future. In fact, he refers to a 
notion of the 'pure past' that coexists with the present, and constitutes it; the 
present, on this view, is a dimension of the past rather than vice versa (see 
Bergson 1990, and Deleuze 1994: 82). 
Around the same time, Husserl's rich analyses of internal time-conscious-
ness significantly deepened our understanding of time by showing that rather 
than conscious life being comprised of a series of 'now' moments, there is a 
necessary intertwining of anticipative 'protention' in relation to the future 
and 'retention' of the past. His concern was to describe our experience of 
time, as well as to delimit some of the non-empirical (and non-analytic) 
conditions of possibility for any experience of time. For most phenomenolo-
gists, it is this relation between protention, primal impression, and retention 
which makes possible the experience of, say, temporal flow. We need not 
have an actual experience of protention, but we must deduce such features in 
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order to coherently explain our experience of, say, listening to a melody. In 
other words, these features are claimed to be the transcendental conditions of 
temporal experience in its myriad forms, and these time-constituting phe-
nomena are not themselves determinable as occurring in the present, past, or 
future, in the same way as the events that historically happen. In 1927, 
Heidegger's Being and Time also gave time a transcendental significance, 
insisting that, both for Dasein and ontologically, a philosophical priority 
must be accorded to the 'not yet,' the 'to come,' the possible, and the future. 
In fact, the temporal structure that Heidegger calls 'care' is the basis from 
which he seeks to derive his philosophical accounts of space and place, and 
this privilege that he initially gave to time over space has been influential on 
much of the ensuing Continental 'tradition,' especially poststructuralism. 
It is important to note what dialogues did and did not occur during this 
formative period of the 'divide.' In terms of what did not take place, it is 
telling that there was very little substantive engagement between the pheno-
menological/Bergsonian accounts of time and McTaggart's metaphysical 
concerns with what he called the A-series and 8-series of time. Moreover, 
McTaggart's 1908 paper, 'The Unreality of Time,' was very influential upon 
the analytic tradition that was to follow, with the community roughly polaris-
ing around two perspectives-presentism and eternalism-that overlap sub-
stantially with what McTaggart designated as the A-series and B-series, even 
if few accepted his conclusion which is captured by the paper's title (McTag-
gart 1993). Briefly, McTaggart illuminated two ways in which positions in 
time can be ordered. His A-series of time represented a psychological experi-
ence of succession that roughly corresponds to what the phenomenologist 
might call the natural attitude in regard to time, with certain events being 
futural, coming to be present, and then moving into the past and the even 
further past. All of these temporal designations are relative to a given 
'present,' from which certain events are seen to be in the future and others in 
the past. To put this another way, for the A-series positions in time are 
orderable according to their possession of properties like being two days 
future, being present, being one day past, and so forth. But McTaggart also 
suggested that positions in time can also be ordered by two-place relations 
like two days earlier than, one day earlier than, simultaneous with, and so 
forth. This B-series of time--0f before, now, and after-involves a succes-
sion that maintains permanent relations among events, and suggests that 
temporally tensed sentences (like 'I will finish this talk within the allocated 
time') are not required. Most analytic philosophers agree that modern phys-
ics supports this view. Advocates of the A-series are therefore forced to 
either dispute this claim about modern physics, or argue that if it is true then 
modern physics leaves out something fundamental. This latter approach, al-
though relatively rare in analytic philosophy, seems to be the position that 
most Continental philosophers are tacitly committed to, and this is explicitly 
the case in Heidegger's work, as we will see. 
In terms of what interaction did occur between the incipient forms of 
analytic and Continental philosophy, there was a series of polemical encoun-
ters between Russell and Bergson, and one of the major philosophical points 
of contention between them concerned time. 3 Russell was considerably wor-
ried about Bergson's anti-intellectualist valorisation of 'intuition,' having 
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once famously quipped that 'intuition is at its best in bats, bees, and Bergson' 
(Russell 1912: 331). 4 From Bergson's perspective, however, bound up with 
the method of intuition, and justifying its philosophical deployment, was his 
understanding of time. Bergson's view can be summarised as arguing that 
'the real nature of time resides not in its segmented parts but in its given, 
experiential character as duration: the irreducible, purely qualitative, cumula-
tive flow of a multiplicity of states which forms an indivisible, heterogenous 
continuum' (Bradley 2003: 441 ). All attempts to understand time (or, for that 
matter, life or existence) by partitioning it into quantifiable items are bound 
to fail. They are spatialising abstractions that use the 'intelligence' to break 
things down into their subcomponents (what Michael Beaney [2007] might 
call decompositional analysis), but for Bergson time is underivable or irredu-
cible, in that it cannot be analysed by reference to anything which is non-
temporal. And we should note that the real nature of time was thought to 
pertain to this experiential (and, simultaneously, transcendental) characteris-
tic, not to the four-dimensional continuum advocated by physicists and ana-
lytic philosophers. For Bergson, it is the former that is the condition for the 
latter, rather than the other way around. Prima facie this kind of sentiment 
sits uneasily with analytic philosophy as a method, and, unsurprisingly, Rus-
sell was rather antagonistic towards such a view. He was not prepared to 
accept the qualitative (and ontological) difference between time and space 
that Bergson insisted upon. And Russell could empirically justify this by 
pointing to work in physics and mathematics. On a similar basis, J. J. C. 
Smart, W. V. 0. Quine, and many other analytic philosophers have argued 
that there is no objective ontological difference in kind between the past, the 
present, and the future, just as there is no ontological difference between here 
and there. It would be conceded that, 'Yes, we thank goodness that the pain is 
there rather than here, and past rather than present, but these differences are 
subjective, being dependent on our point of view' (Dowden 2009). It is 
merely mental perspectives that divide the block into a past part, a present 
part, and a future part, and that radically distinguish time and space. Partly 
because of some similar considerations, Russell even felt entitled to proclaim 
that time was an 'unimportant and superficial characteristic of reality' (1986: 
42), and yet, for Bergson, time is closer to ultimate reality, a transcendental 
condition of the spatial, of change, of life, and so forth. 
An even more famous textual polemic transpired between Heidegger and 
Carnap in the early 1930s, which was fundamental to the perpetuation of the 
idea of philosophy being a 'divided house.' 5 Carnap used the logical positi-
vist's verifiability criterion of meaning, which holds that genuine assertions 
must be verifiable through either experience or observation (a criterion that 
could not itself be verified), to critique Heidegger's allegedly nonsensical 
and metaphysical comment that 'the nothing nothings' (see Carnap 1996, and 
Heidegger 1996). Although this engagement never focused upon the issue of 
time, it is important to note that Carnap, Reichenbach, and other logical 
positivists were substantially concerned with the philosophical implications 
of the theory of relativity, especially in regard to space and time. Carnap 
wrote a thesis setting out an axiomatic theory of space and time, and Re-
ichenbach became a well-known philosopher of science who wrote many 
books on the relationship between logical positivism and Einsteinian physics. 
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Both became major figures in the United States in the 1930s, and instrumen-
tal to the rise of analytic philosophy there, after they fled Europe due to the 
threat of Nazism. On the other hand, Heidegger's Being and Time gave 
almost no consideration to Einsteinian physics despite being written in 1927. 
His later work indicates that he felt that Einsteinian physics (like Newtonian 
physics, which is addressed in Being and Time) continued to treat time as an 
entity (a thing), rather than the condition of possibility of our experience of 
things, thus covering over what he called the ontico-ontological difference. 6 
While logical positivism as a program has been almost entirely aban-
doned in analytic philosophy, some of the crucial differences that were ap-
parent at this stage (and earlier in the Bergson-Russell debate) have recurred 
throughout the twentieth century as the analytic-Continental divide has be-
come increasingly institutionalised and specialised. On my view, three such 
enduring features include: (I) The respect (or otherwise) accorded to 
transcendental arguments generally and about time specifically; (2) The 
proximity (or otherwise) of the relationship between the philosopher and the 
physicist/mathematician/logician; and (3) The fact that contemporary four-
dimensionalists and eternalists partake in the ideal language aspirations of 
early logical positivism in maintaining that tensed talk (e.g., 'I will finish this 
paper') can ultimately be replaced by tenseless talk (e.g., 'at time t2 I finish 
this paper, which happens after the time of this utterance'). Now I don't want 
to deny that on all three of these points change has occurred in the history of 
analytic philosophy in the twentieth century, nor do l want to allege that at 
any given synchronic time there has been consensus on these issues. Howev-
er, it is difficult to deny that the vast majority of contemporary analytic 
philosophers harbour reservations about transcendental philosophy and are 
involved in a relationship of deference to the best findings of the 'hard' 
sciences indexed to the present, with the vast majority of Continental philos-
ophers typically using transcendental arguments, critically and creatively 
(i.e., non-deferentially) engaging with science, and showing little interest in 
the so-called hard sciences, or even being comparatively ignorant of develop-
ments in this area. 7 What this means for the philosophy of time is well 
captured by Keith Ansell-Pearson's summary ofthe Russell-Bergson debate: 
'The physicist gives us space-time in which time has no independent mean-
ing; but the philosopher holds that space-time is really spatialised time and 
not time at all. The physicist then retorts that the time of the philosopher is 
merely phenomenological or psychological' (Ansell-Pearson 1997: 44). As 
would be clear, I think that Ansell-Pearson's 'physicist' here can be seen to 
stand in for most analytic philosophers, including Russell, Carnap, Reichen-
bach, and myriad recent four-dimensionalists. If this characterisation is valid, 
it seems plausible to maintain that in regard to the philosophy of time some-
thing like what Lyotard calls a differend-a case of conflict between two 
parties that does not allow for the possibility of a rule or criterion (or even a 
linguistic vocabulary 8) by which the dispute may be fairly decided (see 
Woodward 2006 and Lyotard 1989)-continues to bedevil analytic and Con-
tinental philosophy. Since Heidegger, Continental philosophy has been wary 
of forms of temporal presentism (including references to immediacy, intui-
tions, any postulation of an undivided 'now') in a manner that is radically 
distinct from the analytic metaphysical privileging of it (presentism) or indif-
244 Chapter20 
ference concerning it (four-dimensionalism). Moreover, for most if not all 
Continental philosophers the very possibility of philosophising, questioning, 
and thinking requires that one consider the relationship between time and 
'subjectivity,' 9 whereas the majority of analytic philosophers evince by their 
practices that this is not the direction to go. This divide only gets reinforced 
when metaphysical or transcendental reflections on time become associated 
with socio-political critique, as happens with Marxist philosophers and, in a 
different way, in the poststructuralist guise of Continental philosophy that we 
will now consider. 
TIME AND POLITICS 
Many of the most famous Continental philosophers have seen an intimate 
relation between philosophies of time and socio-political issues, including 
Hegel, Marx, and Heidegger. How might we explain or argue for this con-
nection? From a sociological and psychological perspective, one might point 
to the manner in which capitalism and urban life has caused many of us to 
feel that time has sped up and accelerated. Many of us feel that we have a 
kind of time-sickness-that is, the belief that time is running away from us, 
making us impatient, and so on, and that we need more of it, as if it were 
something that could be added to all of the other things we need more of, like 
money, goods, love, and so forth. In his popular book, In Praise of Slow 
(2004 ), Carl Honore suggests that 'the clock is the operating system of mod-
ern capitalism, the thing that makes everything else possible-meetings, 
deadlines, contracts, manufacturing processes, schedules, transport, working 
shifts' (p. 22). Lawyers may be the most obvious case of the dominance of 
clock-time in their daily lives, most being required to keep an exceedingly 
close eye on their time such that six-minute billing blocks can be established. 
But Honore details all kinds of societies who have responded to this monitor-
ing of time by staging various kinds of slow movements that embrace a 
different understanding of time-Austria's Society for the Deceleration of 
Time, Japan's Sloth Club, the Long Now Foundation in the United States. 
Many have abandoned clocks and radically changed the structure of their 
working week. These various organisations also point to quite convincing 
empirical studies that show us that time pressure can lead to tunnel-vision, 
which, of course, has political and social consequences in the form of bad 
decision-making. 10 In fact, in this essay I want to claim something similar: 
that theoretical myopia about time, or to put it another way a reductive or 
non-pluralistic approach to time, can create philosophical problems and lead 
to bad methodological decisions which ultimately result in, at best, partial 
philosophical conclusions. 
But challenges to this dominant conception of time as involving a series 
of moments, a linear trajectory that clock-time regulates and subjects to our 
control, might also be made on philosophical grounds. In fact, to simplify 
greatly what will follow, it is this understanding of time as about measure-
ment and thus as amenable to calculation, prediction, arithmetical division, 
and ultimately time-keeping, that all of the different poststructuralist thinkers 
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challenge, sometimes on ethico-political grounds but also on philosophical 
ones. Most frequently, the philosophical reasons rely on various forms of 
transcendental argument, which are given to explain why linear-clock time 
(or theoretical ideas of time that are dependent on a clock-like series of 
moments) are an abstraction from lived time, or are dependent upon the 
existence of a past that cannot be recalled and a future that cannot be antici-
pated, and incoherent without them. Methodologically speaking, the prolific 
use of transcendental arguments within Continental philosophy constitutes a 
major point of difference with analytic philosophy as we have seen, but to 
view this as the fundamental metaphilosophical cause of the analytic-Conti-
nental divide would be to ignore the fact that many of the other major Conti-
nental methods (including genealogy, hermeneutics, 'intuition' for Bergson, 
and phenomenology, especially in its Heideggerian and Merleau-Pontyian 
inflections) are also bound up with philosophies of time. They are all meth-
ods that develop and affirm our essential historicity, as does the conception 
of reason that is invoked. 11 
In more recent times, an emphasis upon the future (and the event) that 
defies anticipation and hence cannot be understood as 'soon to be present' is 
arguably shared by all of the major thinkers said to be poststructuralist. 12 
Derrida and Deleuze certainly emphasise a conception of the future whose 
significance lies in the way in which it simultaneously interrupts any 'now' 
or present moment and is a condition of possibility for any event worthy of 
the name. Indeed, they both also invoke Hamlet and maintain that an event 
can only occur when time is 'out of joint' in the way that they associate with 
futurity; otherwise there is no possibility of the event but merely a pre-
programmed or deterministic outcome. They assert that it is this aspect of the 
radical singularity of any event that needs to be emphasised as a counterbal-
ance to conceptions of time in which the future is treated as known and 
apprehended according to either the habitual expectations of the present, or 
the predictions and calculations that are based on what we presently know. 
On this view, the future is fundamentally not amenable to prediction and 
calculation, whereas analytic philosophy arguably tacitly endorses the calcu-
lative model in relation to the future in the frequent use it makes of logical 
modelling and probability analyses (cf. Bayesianism), and in its prolific use 
of thought experiments, which as Bernard Williams (1976: 97) suggests, 
involve a predictive relationship to the future: the past is only relevant in 
order to predict the future. 
But what is wrong with anticipating the future and saying the future will 
be like this or that? While holding that ( 1) we cannot avoid anticipating the 
future, and (2) that we must try to predict and calculate future consequences 
for any decision that hopes to be responsible (that is to say that we must 
prepare), Derrida's work intimates that exclusive adherence to these kind of 
relations to the future can be dangerous. Certainly if such a relationship to the 
future, a calculative one, becomes dominant in a given milieu, it can lead to 
the absolutist violence of fascism and communism in which in the name of 
this or that future state of affairs individuals silence or kill those who do not 
believe in such a future. Less dramatically and more frequently they lead to 
the minor fascisms of everyday life in which no one dies but conceptual and 
interpersonal violence nevertheless takes place. This means that Derrida will 
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not name the future. Democracy and justice must instead be understood as 'to 
come' and unable to ever be actualised in a present situation. This trajectory 
of Derrida's thought need not be re-elaborated here, but it is worth emphasis-
ing that this futural dimension of time that he refers to has a curious structure 
in that it intervenes in the time of the present and breaks it open, without ever 
fully coming to presence, and a similar predicament afflicts our relationship 
to the past. One cannot, after all, attain to a self-contained present that is 
inured from the past, and yet this past cannot be presented before us and 
recognised in its totality. To put this another way, the influence of the past 
upon our present is largely unspecifiable, despite what some psychoanalysts 
suggest, and yet they are right in seeing such influence as being pervasive. 
Borrowing from Levinas, Derrida maintains the thought that there is some-
thing akin to an 'ethical past,' an immersion in the weight of history that is 
immemorial. This ethical past cannot be represented or recalled, one cannot 
assume responsibility for it as a totality, and the trick is hence not to see the 
past as an origin to which one might return. In contradistinction to any 
temporal presentism, then, Derrida reminds us of both the future and its 
radical indeterminability, and also the immemorial past that defies conscious 
memory and representation but nonetheless subsists in the form of traces. 
In his analyses of the times of Chronos and Aion in Logic of Sense, 
Deleuze makes some closely related points. He describes two different as-
pects of time that he also calJ the time of sense (and thus, we might say, the 
time of reason) and the time of nonsense. Chronos is described as the time of 
the present (sense), of measurement and linear clock-time, and as a world-
view that insists that only the present can be truly said to exist. On this view, 
which is also that of Augustine and contemporary analytic metaphysical 
presentists, no reality can be ascribed to that which is not. For Deleuze, 
however, the time of Aion is equally real and is described as the disruptive 
moment in which any given present is always dividing into both the past and 
the future, such that there is, in fact, no present. Only the past and future truly 
subsist in time on this view, and Deleuze hence caJJs A ion the time of the 
eternal and the time of the event. The time of Chronos anticipates from this 
present moment until that present moment (habit) calculates that if A hap-
pens then it will be expeditious to respond with B (reflection and representa-
tion). But these anticipations and calculations in regard to the past and the 
future depend upon another immeasurable aspect of time that is both their 
transcendental condition and also the empirical progenitor of real social 
transformation, as becomes clearest in Deleuze and Guattari 's A Thousand 
Plateaus (1987: 262). According to Deleuze's The Logic of Sense, the rever-
sals in Lewis Carroll's Alice books give us some kind of indication of this 
second order of time, A ion, and they also help explain the association of this 
order of time with nonsense. In Carroll's world, which Deleuze thinks is also 
ours in a certain sense, characters are punished before having done anything 
wrong, or they cry before pricking themselves. Now, there may be empirical 
explanations for such behaviour, of course, but, for Deleuze, these are not of 
the order of the event. Empirical explanations fail to see that what has oc-
curred is never wounding or traumatising because of any particular actuality, 
whatever it may be, but that we are wounded because of the prospect of 
worse 'to come' in the future, or because of the relation that any given 
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actuality bears to the complex of temporal syntheses that is our past (or, to 
phrase this more positively, we are likewise inspired and touched by events 
because of their relation to the time of A ion). As such, it is the future and the 
past that affect us; they are the time of the event. When we try and explain 
May 68, likewise, we can proffer historical or empirical conditions that were 
causally involved in the uprising, but the Event of May 68 cannot be reduced 
to that. That which made the situation vital and provocative came from 
elsewhere, from that openness to the future that necessarily resists our calcu-
lative entreaties and that immemorial past which cannot be represented as a 
totality. Another way of putting this point might be to say that if rationality 
purports to be atemporal, albeit with its claims being expressed in the present 
tense (inference and verification are of the present tense), 13 then there is 
something that will always elide such forms of reason. We might say, as 
Levinas (1987: I 03-4) does, that rationality (and he would also say scientific 
time) involves a synchronisation of the diverse that cannot comprehend di-
achrony: in this case, the past that subsists and the future that cannot be 
anticipated but instead disrupts. 
For all of these philosophers, then, there is an intricate and complicated 
topology to time, which, if simplified (e.g., treated linearly, spatially, etc.), 
can degenerate into problematic political positions and to violence. To put 
the point another way, any such misconstrual of time involves a transcenden-
tal violence that is often the progenitor of more empirical instances of vio-
lence. David Wood (2005: 22) sums up this tradition by specifically under-
standing violence as a disease of time, as a 'chronopathology,' and he sug-
gests that what Nietzsche diagnoses as ressentiment (a disgust for life that 
trades in negativity) is fundamentally a taking revenge against the fact that 
time passes. The major form that this ressentiment consists in is by artificial-
ly delimiting time and insisting upon the priority of the present, and this 
could include the invocation of a self-contained intuitive present, or an ahis-
torical calculative deduction. Ethico-political problems are in store for us 
when the living present is understood as self-contained, for example when 
we jealously seek to preserve some feature of the present (Merleau-Ponty 
I 964: I 10). Problems are also likely when we are nostalgic for the past or 
seek to return to some origin, and violence is not far away when the future is 
circumscribed and delimited by the expectations of the present. Institutions 
and societies are worthy of critique to the extent that any of these above 
chronopathologies take on a dominant form. Now, this account of time and 
its relation to ethico-political matters is unlikely to be taken seriously by 
many analytic philosophers, possibly on account of the charge that such 
claims remain psychological points buttressed with transcendental claims 
that never adequately display their necessity. But even assuming that it were, 
it remains to be seen just what kind of relationship these accounts bear to 
existing philosophy of time in analytic philosophy. It is to this question that 
we now turn. 
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TIME IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND BEYOND 
While time has been a major area of philosophical inquiry in analytic meta-
physics, philosophy of science, and personal identity, no wholesale turn like 
that which I have associated with Continental philosophy ever takes place. 
An explicit engagement with time is not a mandatory aspect of any genuinely 
original philosophy, although the less piecemeal and more systematic pro-
jects in analytic philosophy must give philosophy of time serious attention. 
Moreover, such philosophers often envisage themselves as clarifying the 
physics, which is ultimately the truth about time, or 'situating' it within a 
framework of other epistemological and metaphysical claims. Most contem-
porary analytic philosophers are hence four-dimensionalists about time, de-
veloping an account of time that supplements post-Einsteinian physics. It 
would, however, be a simplification to argue that the difference between 
analytic and Continental philosophies of time is reducible without remainder 
to the issue of the status of the philosopher's role in relation to the findings of 
physics. There are, after all, plenty of analytic metaphysicians of time who 
do armchair philosophy about time involving conceptual analysis, and who 
aren't particularly concerned with the latest developments in physics. In fact, 
there is a split between the four-dimensionalists who bite the physicist's 
bullet and say that the passage of time (and the experience of the 'now') is an 
illusion, and others (like John Bigelow and Arthur Prior) who would claim it 
is a Moorean fact and not an experiential illusion, a split that can be traced all 
the way back to the work of McTaggart. Perhaps it is possible to argue for 
the compatibility of presentism and relativity/four-dimensionalism, as John 
Bigelow has recently done, 14 but such views are yet to be widely accepted. 
Both of these dominant trajectories will be considered here, but there is also a 
further issue that we will address. If time and method are bound up with one 
another according to Continental philosophers, then, it must be asked: is 
there an implicit philosophy of time underwriting some ofthe major method-
ological practices of analytic philosophy? To put it another way, what do the 
main philosophical methods presuppose about the analytic philosopher's 
time-embeddedness, for want of a better term? Perhaps some of the metho-
dologies that are used are temporally restricted, reliant on the present even 
while the content of their avowed philosophical positions is generally stri-
dently anti-presentist. 
This is, in fact, what I will argue in what follows since, prima facie, the 
main methods associated with Continental philosophy are not deployed in the 
analytic tradition: genealogy, hermeneutics, deconstruction, and so forth, are 
not fundamental, and nor, more significantly, is transcendental argumenta-
tion. Indeed, we need to note that analytic philosophy's general scepticism 
about the value of transcendental arguments (and therefore about forms of 
'first philosophy' more generally) is certainly operative in the area of philos-
ophy of time. In fact, this methodological wariness partly explains the two 
main ways in which philosophy of time has been practiced: ( 1) A deferential 
relationship to the physicist's understanding of time; and (2) A pursuit of 
what might be called minimalist metaphysics without transcendental argu-
ments. As Robin Le Poidevin and Murray McBeath (1993: 16) note, it seems 
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that Kant's antinomies (time has a beginning; time has no beginning) are the 
source of the analytic feeling that a priori arguments for time having a 
certain structure or topology are doomed to end in failure. Despite this, 
Heidegger claimed in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1997) that it is 
Kant who in fact made a decisive temporal turn, a turn which Heidegger 
argues is the turning-point in modern philosophy and one within which his 
own philosophical project can be situated. 15 In response to this incredulity 
when it comes to first philosophy and transcendental argumentation, Bill 
Newton-Smith's book, The Structure of Time ( 1980), argues that the struc-
ture of time is a matter that can only be settled empirically; physicists alone 
can determine, for example, whether or not time is bounded. In a related 
vein, in Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point ( 1996) Huw Price seeks to re-
establish an Archimedean point for knowledge outside of the relativism that 
seems to be a consequence of the special theory of relativity and our various 
anthropocentric biases, most particularly the fact that our philosophising and 
thinking about time is greatly affected by our own finite status as creatures in 
time. Price adopts the reverse procedure to Heidegger and attempts to dispel 
rather than dwell on this paradoxical temporal structure by reinstating an 
objective atemporality, a view from "nowhen.' 
When analytic philosophers do metaphysics of time, on the other hand, 
this is not in the sense that one might think. Rather than venturing into what 
might be termed "strong' necessary conditions of possibility terrain, issues 
regarding the passage and structure of time are often understood to be an-
swered via logic and an analysis of what makes tensed statements true. There 
are also many thought experiments in which one is asked to imagine that 
someone knows all that there is to know about time, history, and dates, but 
does not know which date is the present one. Swinburne ( 1990) and Sosa 
( 1983) argue, for example, that this suggests there are temporal subjective 
facts. Likewise, there are thought experiments like Sidney Shoemaker's "fro-
zen time' and ongoing analyses of time-travel as philosophers attempt to 
decide if the asymmetry of causation is related to the asymmetry of before 
and after. 16 
Radical revisions to our common sense understandings of time are coun-
tenanced by many of these philosophers. Nowhere does it seem that a chron-
ological, linear understanding of time as a succession of instants is dominant, 
and yet nowhere is there any kind of reflection like that which Continental 
philosophers go in for, whether they be phenomenologists or poststructural-
ists (Continental philosophy is itself a divided house, along these and other 
I in es). Can we even situate the 'Continental' perspectives that we have con-
sidered in terms of the debate between two views on the nature of temporal 
reality-presentism and eternalism-that have dominated analytic philoso-
phy? Both seem to fail to capture what is at stake in Continental reflections 
on time, whether at the beginning of the twentieth century or the end. Conti-
nental philosophers since Heidegger want to dispute the philosophical prior-
ity of the present, as the majority analytic eternalist camp does, but also to 
insist (unlike eternalists) on temporal becoming, on ontological distinctions 
between past, present, and future, as well as between time and space. This 
conjunction of claims has no equivalent in analytic philosophy, perhaps be-
cause it is not readily compatible with physics. Of course, there are some 
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analytic philosophers who feel that the etemalism and presentism alternatives 
are unduly restrictive too, including those (often Wittgensteinians) who 
maintain that the debate is merely verbal because each side is using the word 
'real' in a different sense; the presentist uses it in a tensed sense, whereas the 
eternalist uses it in an untensed sense (see Dowden 2009 and Dolev 2007).17 
Nonetheless, perhaps due to the practice of conditionalisation (maximising 
inferential connections so dialogue and communal progress can be made) 
much of the debate revolves around evaluating the pros and cons of two (or 
at most three) main accounts of time: presentism, eternalism, and to a lesser 
extent, the 'growing universe' theory. None of these frameworks resemble in 
either methods or conclusions the kind of positions and arguments proffered 
by Deleuze and Derrida, or for that matter by Husserl and Bergson. Consider, 
for example, the commonly espoused B-series claim that 'when we say that 
the year 1900 has the property of being past, all we really mean is that 1900 
is earlier than the time at which we are speaking. On this view, there is no 
sense in which it is true to say that time really passes, and any appearance to 
the contrary is merely a result of the way we humans happen to perceive the 
world' (Markosian 2008: §5). This idea that the past might become part of an 
omni-temporal space-time block, rather than retain its own significance, is, I 
think precisely what the notion of an immemorial past (Derrida), or a virtual 
past (Bergson and Deleuze ), would deny. 
There is, likewise, a genuine clash between the phenomenological ac-
counts of time and what analytic philosophers are interested in. In one sense, 
this is perfectly understandable. Phenomenology focuses upon describing our 
experience of time, which might include the interplay between the three 
different temporal dimensions as they are differently experienced in, say, 
boredom, anxiety, or listening to a melody (or even as capitalism impacts 
upon our experience of each). In addition, phenomenologists delimit some of 
the non-empirical conditions of possibility for the experience of time. It 
hence examines subjective experience and the conditions of possibility for 
that experience, whereas physicists are concerned with objective or physical 
time (what is ultimately out there in the world). What are we to make of these 
very different accounts? Can they both be true? It seems we are faced with a 
dilemma: pluralism or reductionism? 
We can be pluralists, and say that both are right in their own domain 
(roughly the subjective vs. the objective, the phenomenological vs. the natu-
ralistic), but this risks a resulting vacuity or lack of philosophical depth, as 
well as not seeing the ramifications that each view has for the other in that 
there must be some interrelation between these different philosophies of 
time-unless we are prepared to countenance a radical dualism, which few 
analytic or Continental philosophers are prepared to do. Indeed, if physical 
time and psychological time are two different kinds of time, then extensive 
commentary is required regarding their relationship to one another, some-
thing that is generally not forthcoming in the work of either analytic or 
Continental philosophers. Moreover the contrast between the subjective and 
objective domains doesn't quite capture what is at stake, since it ignores 
issues to do with transcendental arguments about time that have been the 
focus of Continental philosophy throughout the twentieth century. Indeed, 
even phenomenology is seeking to offer an account of subjective experience, 
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rather than merely a subjective account of experience (Gallagher and Zahavi 
2008: 19). 18 
Alternatively, we can be reductive and say that one of these two philoso-
phies of time derives from the other, the latter of which is more fundamental. 
It seems to me that both analytic and Continental philosophers tend to choose 
this option far more often than ecumenical pluralism, although the methods 
and rationale provided for these orders of priority and reductions is very 
different. How else might we explain the suggestion made by many analytic 
philosophers that subjective or psychological time is an illusion and that 
physical time is more fundamental, even though psychological time is dis-
covered first by each of us as we grow out of our childhood, and even though 
psychological time was discovered first as we human beings evolved from 
our animal ancestors (Dowden 2009)? How else might we explain the fol-
lowing phenomenological claim from Gallagher and Zahavi 's The Pheno-
menological Mind (2008)? 
There is no pure third person perspective, just as there is no view from nowhere. To 
believe in the existence of such a pure third-person perspective is to succumb to an 
objectivist illusion. This is, of course, not to say that there is no third-person per-
spective ... but it is a perspective founded upon a first-person perspective, or, to be 
more precise, it emerges out of the encounter between at least two first-person 
perspectives; that is, it involves inter-subjectivity. (2008: 40) 
On such a view, the conditions of subjective time are also the conditions of 
possibility of inter-subjectivity, which are, in turn, the condition of possibil-
ity of the objective time of the physicists. Moreover, for them any account of 
time that ignores its experiential development in humans, that gives no atten-
tion to questions of conditions of possibility of temporal experience, will be 
one-sided. 
Indeed, issues pertaining to the genesis of knowledge and its development 
are important to all Continental philosophers, thus inviting the charge of 
perpetuating the genetic fallacy in thinking that an analysis of origins has 
anything to do with the evaluation or justification of present knowledge 
claims. Sometimes this is perhaps a fair charge, but the reverse is also a risk, 
what James Williams (2005) has termed the 'anti-genealogical fallacy,' an 
accusation that might be bestowed on any view that thinks that concepts or 
reason come from nowhere, like manna from heaven, or that we might trans-
late our over-determined and messy language, with its history of associated 
concepts, into a pure language that overcomes such difficulties. Indeed, con-
temporary four-dimensionalists are committed to the view that the correct 
theory of time, the metaphysical truth about time, is ultimately tense-less. 19 
Statements like 'I will finish this paper in the future' can be replaced by 
statements that omit the temporal element. Yet, prima facie, our experiences 
of time and the way we learn about the world is through and through tempo-
rally tensed, since we navigate in the world through our bodies and their 
temporal anticipative capacities. Bodily motility and intentionality simply 
are temporally tensed. For example, the perception of an object is informed 
by procedural memory (habits) and it also gives us hitherto undisclosed 
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sides, sides that our attention might be directed towards in the future. Of 
course, a possible rejoinder to this might be that this temporal experience 
says nothing about whether these subjective phenomena are ultimately real. 
But, for most Continental philosophers, at least from Husserl, Sartre, and 
Merleau-Ponty on, such experiences are the transcendental condition of our 
experience of a world at all, from which scientific analyses are based. Ana-
lytic philosophers might accept that a condition of the development of the 
hard sciences is this embodied dimension, but insist that issues to do with the 
truth (or metaphysical reality) of what is discovered leaves such genetic 
questions behind. Does this commit many analytic philosophers to positing a 
view from nowhere as it was criticised by Nagel, or more to the point does it 
commit them to positing an atemporal view from 'nowhen,' as Huw Price 
has happily accepted in his book Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point 
( 1996)? I cannot adequately resolve this dispute here, but it seems that we 
have encountered a contretemps that helps to explain the rather pervasive 
non-engagement between representatives of analytic and Continental philos-
ophy in the twentieth century. There will, no doubt, be many counterexam-
ples to any thesis like this (such as Willfrid Sellars 20), but this chapter has 
nonetheless begun to show what is distinctive about the philosophy of time 
of large parts of Continental philosophy and also distinguished this from the 
philosophy of time that takes places in analytic philosophy. 
Are we confronted here with incommensurable paradigms or stances that 
do not admit of criteria that might resolve the dispute in a non-question-
begging way? Perhaps, but it is also possible that a more pluralist methodolo-
gy can help us here, especially one that can find a place for transcendental 
arguments. The myriad criticisms raised against such arguments by analytic 
philosophers cannot be rigorously addressed here, but transcendental argu-
ments ought not be too hastily prohibited on the grounds that they are some-
times, or even frequently, liable to error (i.e., dogmatic claims to necessity, 
circularity, etc.). Being primarily concerned with error avoidance is a conser-
vative philosophical ambition that does not necessarily coincide with the 
ambition to seek truth or achieve genuine insight; the risk of error might be 
eliminated only to be replaced by the risk of banality or obsolescence. 21 But 
this argument need not depend on one wholeheartedly agreeing that transcen-
dental arguments can be usefully deployed. After all, it is clear that certain 
philosophical methods focus upon our affirming our historicity (and our 
exposure to an unknown future) more than others. While no particular meth-
od can immunise us against the risk of philosophical failure, there is good 
reason to prefer the prospects of a more pluralist methodology that can find a 
place for genealogical, transcendental, and phenomenological analyses, as 
well as many of the various techniques that have become part and parcel of 
analytic philosophy. Such a diverse toolbox of methods might ensure that we 
don't remain enthralled with one temporal modality at the expense of others 
and that we don't preserve the name truth for any single one of those do-
mains. Such a synthesis is improbable and perhaps it is even impossible at 
least in the foreseeable future, but we must at least confront the prospect of 
meta-philosophical dialogue and disagreement. Without it, philosophy of all 
kinds can become insular and all too confident of expertise in a given narrow 
domain of academic specialisation. Such an attitude is not very philosophi-
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cal. If learning only occurs, as Deleuze (1994) suggests, intermediate be-
tween knowledge and non-knowledge, let us hope that philosophers of all 
varieties can, at least from time to time, leave behind their habitual special-
isations and certitudes. As Socrates said, let us know that we do not know, 
which in the context of this chapter might amount to saying let us hope that 
more philosophers can become postanalytic and meta-Continental. 22 
NOTES 
I. Thanks are due to the Australian Research Council for funding this research, as well as 
to my collaborators on this project, James Chase, James Williams, and Edwin Mares. 
2. It also challenges the ·growing universe' theory, which holds that both the present and 
the past are real (the name deriving from the idea that any list of entities that are real necessari-
ly increases over time as things that are present become past), but we cannot consider this 
position here. 
3. Russell published a strongly worded critical review of Bergson's work (see Russell 
1912), and continued to criticise his colleague from the other side of the Channel for years to 
come. The disparity between their views on time and multiplicity became apparent when they 
were co-participants at a conference with Einstein in 1922 at the College de France. Bergson 
also gets a tough time in Russell's History of Western Philosophy (1946). 
4. Bergsonian intuition is understood by Russell to be equivalent with mere instinct, which 
is not quite true; it develops from instinct, but this does not mean it is reducible to it. And 
certainly Bergson does not think the instinctive abilities of bats and bees allow them to do 
metaphysics! Nonetheless, it seems fair to say that there is an anti-intellectualist spirit in the 
work of Bergson that can be discerned in much of twentieth-century Continental thought that 
the analytic and Russellian projects do not share. And it is, of course, paradoxical for philoso-
phers to take positions that seem anti-intellectualist, although we should not assume that a 
disciplining of reason entails irrational ism, and it might also be argued that this is preferable to 
the opposing alternative, hypostasizing a restricted conception of reason that abstracts itself 
from the life-world. 
5. Michael Friedman also makes its significance clear in A Parting of the Ways (2000). 
6. Jeff Malpas pointed out to me that Heidegger's later work deliberately refers to time-
space rather than space-time, thus tacitly reaffirming the distance of his own reflections from 
Einsteinian physics. 
7. This is not to reinstate the account offered by Sokal and Bricmont ( 1998), and nor is it to 
deny that Badiou and Deleuze, for example, are well appraised of Zermelo-Frankel set theory 
and differential calculus respectively. I do think that the deferential relation is not apparent in 
either of these cases, however, and this is the case with other important Continental philoso-
phers like Gaston Bachelard. Similarly Husserl was thoroughly invested in the sciences and 
mathematics (non-deferentially), and his and Heidegger's anthropology and use of the term 
'Lebenswelt' was influenced by Von Uexkull's discussions of animals and humans and the 
notion of 'unwelt.' 
8. This is perhaps akin to what Miranda Fricker (2003) calls a hermeneutic injustice, where 
a vocabulary is not even available in which to state a given injustice. 
9. Because of its synchronic focus structuralism is difficult to accommodate within such a 
'temporal tum,' but, as Ashley Woodward has pointed out to me, one might nonetheless 
resolve this problem by noting that structuralism is not, predominantly, a philosophical move-
ment. With Derrida and the return to Heidegger, and with Deleuze and a future-inflected return 
to Bergsonian time, we have the philosophy of time again being foregrounded. 
10. Hubert Dreyfus ( 1997) produces some quite compelling empirical research on decision-
making processes that suggest that it is a spontaneous embodied responsiveness to the environ-
ment (which is not a matter of rational calculation) that leads to mastery and expertise in given 
fields, whether they be basketball, chess, philosophy, or even morality. Constant calculators, 
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people who reflect all of the time on the best course of action to take, tend not to make the best 
decisions and do not often reach the highest levels of expertise in a given field. 
11. A certain circularity is also, perhaps, the inevitable result, as Sherah Lee Bloor has 
pointed out to me. 
12. This position owes a lot to Heidegger, but it would be remiss of us to ignore Levinas. 
While his philosophy of time is more commonly associated with an emphasis upon an irrecup· 
erable past that obliges us to respond to it, even though we cannot represent it or know it, his 
position on futurity is very similar to that of Deleuze and Derrida. In Time and the Other 
( 1987), for example, Levinas states that 'anticipation of the future and projection of the future, 
sanctioned as essential to time from Bergson to Sartre, are but the present of the future and not 
the authentic future; the future which is not grasped, which befalls us and lays hold of us. The 
Other is the future' (pp. 76-77). This is a key aspect of the work of virtually all of the 
poststructuralists, including Lyotard, Negri (see his Time for Revolution [2005]), and even their 
sometime critic, Alain Badiou. 
13. As John Mccumber points out, 'An assertion must be simultaneous with whatever it is 
that justifies it, whether that justifying factor is a state of affairs in the world or other assertions 
from which it follows .... The perceptual evidence for the beauty of Cleopatra lies irretrievably 
in the past; all that can justify belief in it today is the surviving testimony' (2007: 69). 
14. In his talk at the 2008 Australasian Association of Philosophy conference, Bigelow 
argued that presentism and four-dimensionalism are compatible, at least if relativity theories 
can be more modest than they usually are and do not claim that they represent the whole truth, 
the final world on the universe. Relativity theory needs to be cleared of its positivist element 
and to acknowledge that acceleration, for example, is an entirely non·relative matter. 
15. Of course, it is by now a cliche that analytic philosophers tend to read the first critique, 
while Continental philosophers are more interested in the third. 
16. Hugh Mellor, however, deplores thought experiments that use 'fantasy arguments' about 
time. He writes that this kind of argument 'presumes to show something possible by describing 
an imaginary world in which we should apparently be inclined to believe the possibility actual' 
(quoted in Le Poidevin and MacBeath 1993: 17). For Mellor, though, showing plausibility is 
not enough to show possibility. 
I 7. Dolev (2007) suggests they both share an 'ontological assumption,' and intimates that a 
return to phenomenology might be worthwhile. 
18. In addition, there are some significant differences between phenomenology and post-
structuralism that such a fonnulation would conflate. For Deleuze, transcendental philosophy 
and Freud allow us to get beyond the time of consciousness and the time of embodied subjec-
tivity. I become a multiplicity of subjects living different temporalities within the same, not so 
unified being. See Widder (2006): 411. 
19. As Dowden (2009) suggests, for etemalism or the block universe theory 'the future-
tensed sentence, "The Lakers will win the basketball game" might be analyzed as, "The Lakers 
do win at time t, and time t happens after the time of this utterance." The future tense has been 
removed, and the new verb phrases "do win" and "happens after" are tenseless logically, 
although they are grammatically in the present tense.' 
20. As Jim O'Shea pointed out to me, Sellars may be one such case, given his lifelong 
attempts to reconcile a Kantian, experiential conception of time with the scientific image of 
time. 
21. David Coady reminded me that William James made this point forcefully in The Will to 
Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (1956). 
22. As John McCumber (2007: 33) also suggests. 
